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TRUSTS-REsULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS-RIGHT OF THIRD-PARTY
DoNEE To ENFORCE ORAL TRUST OF LAND-Plaintiff alleged that her
husband, having paid the purchase price on l~d intended as a: gift
for her, caused title to be taken in the name of defendant to hold as trustee.
There was, however, no written evidence to support these contentions.
Plaintiff further alleged that she took possession and made valuable
permanent improvements on the land with the approval of both her
husband and defendant. One year after the husband's death and three
years after plaintiff's entrance, defendant filed suit for possession. In the
present action to enjoin that suit and to establish her ownership, the
lower court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim. On appeal, held,
reversed, one judge dissenting. If plaintiff's allegations are accepted as
true, her complaint sets out facts upon which relief could be granted.
Either a resulting trust or a constructive trust might be imposed in
plaintiff's behalf.1 Binz v. Helvetia Florida Enterprises, (Fla. App. 1958)
104 S. (2d) 124.
Although the result of the principal case seems desirable, the theories
of relief considered by the court are questionable. Generally, where one
person furnishes the consideration for a conveyance of land to another,
the grantee is presumed to hold for the payor under a purchase-money
resulting trust.2 The court in the principal case, however, seems to have

1 The court also referred to the enforceability of the oral gift under the doctrine
of part performance. This theory, however, would be to no avail if the trust transaction
left plaintiff's hus:band with no interest to give her. Therefore, it seems that this was
not considered a separate ground for relief but was ·being used in conjunction with the
finding of a trust.
2 Statutes in some jurisdictions have abolished the rule. Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §381.170;
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§555.7-555.9; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §§501.07-501.09; 49 N.Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §94; Wis. Stat. (1957) §§231.07-231.09.
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indicated that where the payor intends a gift of the land to a third party,3
the grantee may hold on a resulting trust for the third party. 4 In finding
a resulting trust for a third party, a court necessarily acts upon the express
intent of the parties. Yet such an ex.tension of the purchase-money resulting
trust doctrine cannot be reconciled with the theory upon which it rests.
The doctrine is justified by .the belief that one who furnishes the consideration for land intends to benefit himself rather than "a stranger." 5
From this normal expectation the payor's intention is presumed without
reference to the actual understanding of the parties.6 Therefore, since
the presumption should operate only in favor of the payor, indication of
the existence of a resulting trust for plaintiff in the principal case would
be unsound.7 But the equivocal language used by the court8 suggests an
alternative analysis. The court may have been holding that a resulting
trust did arise in favor of the payor-husband with plaintiff succeeding to
his interest since his oral gift to her was enforceable under the doctrine
of part performance.9 This analysis, however, seems defective also. While
actual intent is not material in raising the presumption, it would seem
that the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the payor's actual
intention was not to benefit himself.10 In the principal case, proof by
defendant-trustee of the existence of an oral trust for the plaintiff would
seem to constitute such evidence. To allow the trustee to prevail over the
payor on the existence of resulting trust by showing the existence of an
unenforceable trust which he refuses to carry out may appear unfair.11

8 The opinion states that plaintiff's allegations appeared sufficient for application
of the resulting trust doctrine, but fails to make it clear in whose favor the rule would
operate.
4 For similar results, see Lewis v. Lewis, (Mo. 1920) 225 S.W. 974; In re Steel, 125
N.Y.S. 187, 68 Misc. 579 (1910); Freeland v. Williamson, 220 Mo. 217, 119 S.W. 560 (1909);
Siemon v. Schurck, 29 N.Y. 598 (1864).
5 See, e.g., Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 85 N.E. 945 (1908); Aborn v. Searles, 18
R.I. 357, 27 A. 796 (1893); Marcilliat v. Marcilliat, 125 Ind. 472, 25 N.E. 597 (1890).
6 For the historical and practical basis of the purchase-money resulting trust doctrine,
see Scott, "Resulting Trusts Arising Upon the Purchase of Land," 40 HARv. L. REv. 669
(1927).
7 It might ·be argued that the husband was in substance making a gift of the money
to plaintiff, thus making her the payor. Cf. Gaines v. .Drakeford, 51 S.C. 37, 27 S.E. 960
(1897). But see 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §453, comment a (1935), repudiating this argument.
s See note 3 supra.
9Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882); Burgess v. Burgess, 306 III. 19, 137 N.E. 403
(1922); Kinsell v. Thomas, 18 Cal. App. 683, 124 P. 220 (1912). The kind of "performance"
ordinarily required to enforce a parol gift of land consists of taking possession and
making valuable improvements with the donor's approval. See generally 2 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §441 (1950).
10 Various types of evidence can be used to rebut the presumption. For examples
see 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §§445-456 (1935).
11 In In re Davis, (D.C. Mass. 1901) 112 F. 129, affd. sub nom. In re Peabody, (1st
Cir. 1902) 118 F. 266, the court allowed the presumption to stand despite such proof.
Since the defendant was unwilling to carry out the express trust, the court felt it would
be "inequitable" to give weight to the evidence.
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But in making the oral trust of land unenforceable, the Statute of Frauds
does not make it unlawful or void.12 If the trustee chose to perform the
oral trust, the payor could not object.13
It was also indicated in the principal case that a constructive trust
might be imposed on defendant "to prevent unjust enrichment and abuse
of confidence." 14 Without a showing of a confidential relationship between
her husband and defendant, it is doubtful that plaintiff could recover on
a constructive trust theory.15 Nevertheless, cases involving abuse of a
confidential relationship16 have been recognized as an· exception to the
general refusal of American courts to impose a constructive trust when
a trustee breaches an oral trust of land.17 Though it would seem that
the trustee is unjustly enriched at the expense of the one who paid value
and reposed confidence, the cases usually construct the trust in favor of
the third-party donee.18 The instant case, however, suggests no apparent
ground for any finding of a confidential relationship. Thus it seems
possible that the court may have been relying on the trust relationship
itself as indicating that confidence was reposed in defendant. It is true
that some courts have been very liberal in applying the doctrine of confidential relationship.19 But expanding the concept to embrace every case
involving a trust would result in the exception swallowing the rule.20
Moreover, constructing a trust for the third party would be an undue
violation of the Statute of Frauds since this would be giving effect to the
actual intent of the parties. On the other hand, the court may have been
suggesting that the constructive trust could operate in favor of the payorhusband with plaintiff succeeding to his interest on the gift analysis.
Such a result, even absent confidential relationship, would find support in'
many writers who have criticized the American courts for not recognizing a

12 Dove v. White, 211 Md. 228, 126 A. (2d) 835
13 Dickinson v. Dickinson, 131 Conn. 392, 40 A.

(1956).
(2d) 184 (1944); Hunt v. Hunt, 202
Ark. 130, 149 S.W. (2d) 930 (1941); Faunce v. McCorkle, 321 Pa. 116, 183 A. 926 (1936).
14 The terms "unjust enrichment" and "abuse of confidence" are apparently used
in a synonymous sense by the court. The opinion, at 127, cites a definition which makes
unjust enrichment "the result or• abuse of confidence.
15 See 4 Scorr, TRUsrs, 2d ed., §453 (1956).
16 E.g., Stahl v. Stahl, 214 Ill. 131, 73 N.E. 319; Metzger v. Metzger, 338 Pa. 564, 14
A. (2d) 285.
17 The "American rule" is illustrated by Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala. 579 (1878). See
cases cited in I Scorr, TRUsrs, 2d ed., §44, p. 310, n. 4 (1956).
18 E.g., Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P. (2d) 229 (1949); Stahl v. Stahl, note
16 supra.
19 E.g., Seeberger v. Seeberger, 325 Ill. 47, 155 N:E. 763 (1927). See Bogert, "Confidential Relalions and Unenforceable ·Express Trusts," 13 CoRN. L. Q. 237 (1928).
20 As Professor Bogert has observed, "It is difficult to imagine a grantor transferring
realty to hold under oral promise in trust, unless the grantor is in considerable intimacy
with the grantee and has a high degree of confidence in him." 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES §496, p. 209 (1946).
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distinction between giving restitution to the grantor and enforcing the
parties' intent.2 1
Despite the court's doubtful reasoning, there were present in the principal case elements upon which relief might be granted. Plaintiff's entrance
into possession and adding valuable improvements could have warranted
enforcement of the oral trust by the doctrine of part performance.22 The
difference between using a constructive or resulting trust theory and
enforcing an express trust in some cases may be significant. A constructive
or resulting trust would charge the trustee only with a duty to convey the
land to the beneficiary while enforcement of the express terms of an oral
trust might involve obligating the trustee to perform other duties that
may have been intended in connection with his holding legal title to
the land.
Lawrence E. Blades

,

21 Sec, e.g., 2 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs §401 (1950); Ames, "Constructive Trusts Based Upon
the Breach of an Express Oral Trust of Land," 20 HARv. L. R.Ev. 549 (1907); Stone,
"Resulting Trusts and the Statute of Frauds," 6 COL. L. R.Ev. 326 (1906).
22 Many courts have enforced oral trusts of realty under the doctrine of part performance. See, e.g., Dove v. White, 211 Md. 228, 126 A. (2d) 835 (1956); Mulli v. Mulli,
105 Cal. App. (2d) 68, 232 P. (2d) 556 (1951); Stewart v. Damron, 6!1 Ariz. 158, 160 P.
(2d) !121 (1945); Thierry v. Thierry, 298 Mo. 25, 249 S.W. 946 (192!1). Entrance into possession and valuable improvements by the beneficiary are usually required to make the
oral trust enforceable under the doctrine of part performance. See 1 TRUSTS R.l!sTATEMENT
§50 (1935).

